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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900214-CA
Priority No. 2

RODNEY W. SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant•

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less
than first degree felonies).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court violate Mr. Smith's rights to
confrontation and to present a defense, and misinterpret the rules
of evidence, in excluding evidence concerning the criminal history
of the State's primary witness?
2. Did the trial court violate Mr. Smith's rights to
confrontation and to present a defense, and misinterpret the rules
of evidence, in excluding evidence impeaching key testimony of the
State's primary witness?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's conclusions of law are entitled to no
deference and are reversible if incorrect.

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700

P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are
provided in the body of the brief or Appendix 1:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404
Utah Rule of Evidence 404
Utah Rule of Evidence 607
Utah Rule of Evidence 609
Utah Rule of Evidence 801
Utah Rule of Evidence 802

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The jurors convicted Mr. Smith of theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 (R. 30), 1
and the trial court sentenced him to a term of one to fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison (R. 59). Private trial counsel filed a
motion for a new trial (R. 64-65).

The case was reassigned to

appointed counsel (R. 66-67), and the trial court denied part of the

1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to as
"R." The transcript of the jury selection and pretrial motion will
be referred to as "J.S." The transcript of the trial will be
referred to as "T." The transcript of the hearing on the motion for
a new trial held on December 18, 1989, will be referred to as
"M.H." The transcript of the second hearing on the motion for a new
trial held on March 5, 1990, will be referred to as "M.H.2"
- 2
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motion and took part of it under advisement (R. 77). The court
later denied the portion of the motion for a new trial previously
taken under advisement (R. 84), and this appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 16, 1990, Mr. Smith and his friend, Scott
Montoya, drove a small truck to Hot Water Products, where they
loaded one of the hot tubs worth between $2,500 and $3,900 onto the
truck (T. 30, 98-100).

They then delivered the hot tub to the home

of Scott Davidson (T. 101).
It was Mr. Smith's defense to the theft charge2 that he
lacked the requisite intent because Mr. Davidson had told Mr. Smith
that Mr. Davidson had paid for the hot tub and had asked Mr. Smith
to transport the hot tub to Mr. Davidson's home (T. 112).
In contrast, Mr. Davidson testified for the State,
indicating that Mr. Smith had approached Mr. Davidson about buying
the hot tub from Mr. Smith (T. 49-53).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Rules of Evidence must be construed to facilitate
Mr. Smith's constitutional rights to defend against criminal
charges.

2. Theft is defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 as
follows:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

- 3

-

In excluding evidence concerning Mr. Davidson's criminal
history, and in excluding evidence impeaching Mr. Davidson's
testimony, the trial court misinterpreted the evidentiary rules and
violated Mr. Smith's constitutional rights to defend himself.
Because Mr. Davidson provided the key evidence in the
State's case conflicting with Mr. Smith's defense, the trial court
committed reversible error in witholding from the jurors
Mr. Davidson's criminal history and other evidence impeaching his
testimony.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY ERRORS
VIOLATED MR. SMITH'S RIGHTS TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
AND REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.
As is discussed below, the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of the criminal history of the State's key witness,
Mr. Davidson, because the court erroneously believed that Utah Rules
of Evidence 404(b) and 609(a) shield the State's witness from the
presentation of the defense.

The trial court also misinterpreted

Utah Rule of Evidence 802 as excluding other evidence impeaching the
State's witness.

A. THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE IMPEACHING THE STATE'S KEY
WITNESS AND SUPPORTING MR. SMITH'S DEFENSE.
1. THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF THE STATE WITNESS' FELONY
CONVICTIONS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY BELIEVED THAT UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE 609(a) AND 404(b) SHIELD THE STATE'S WITNESSES.

- 4
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After the jury was selected, but prior to the commencement
of the trial, the court conducted a hearing on various motions in
limine.

Pertinent transcript pages are contained in Appendix 2 to

this brief.
At this hearing, it was established that Mr. Davidson, the
State's key witness who testified in contradiction to Mr. Smith's
defense that Mr. Smith believed that he was merely transporting the
hot tub, had two previous felony theft convictions and a conviction
for possession of a falsified driver's license (J.S. 63).
The court and prosecutor recognized the argument that Utah
Rule of Evidence 609 does not apply to witnesses other than criminal
defendants, and defense counsel argued that when a non-criminal
defendant witness is impeached by prior crimes, there is no threat
that the jury will convict the witness on the basis of prior
convictions, as there is in cases where criminal defendants are
impeached with evidence of prior convictions (J.S. 64-65).

The

prosecutor argued that all witnesses are to be treated as criminal
defendants are under Rule 609, and argued that the prejudice
stemming from Mr. Davidson's criminal history outweighed the
probative value of the criminal history (J.S. 65-66).

The trial

court concluded that all witnesses' criminal histories are treated
the same under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 (J.S. 67).
The trial court indicated that defense counsel could
inquire into Mr. Davidson's prior theft convictions if he could
establish that they were crimes of dishonesty (J.S. 69).

- 5
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Mr. Davidson testified about his convictions, indicating
that the most recent felony theft conviction stemmed from his
transportation of camper shells, as planned by other people
directing the operation (J.S. 74-76).

The court apparently then

ruled that if Mr. Davidson testified that the theft of the hot tub
was Mr. Smith's plan, defense counsel could impeach Mr. Davidson
with evidence concerning the felony theft conviction involving the
camper shell theft (J.S. 78).
Prior to the testimony of Scott Davidson, the trial court
excused the jurors, indicating that the court had decided to reverse
the prior ruling allowing defense counsel to discuss Mr. Davidson's
criminal history, and that the trial court would exclude the
evidence because it was improper character evidence (T. 44-45).
Defense counsel argued that the prior felony conviction of
Mr. Davidson should be admissible to impeach his credibility,
particularly because Mr. Davidson was a government witness rather
than a criminal defendant (T. 45).
The trial court discussed the issue further, concluding
that Mr. Davidson's prior felony convictions were excluded by Utah
Rule of Evidence 404(b) and Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a) (T. 45-47).

2. THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MR. SMITH'S DEFENSE
AND IMPEACHING MR. DAVIDSON BECAUSE THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY BELIEVED
THAT UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 802 EXCLUDES IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE AS
HEARSAY.
Mr. Davidson was allowed to testify that Mr. Smith
contacted Mr. Davidson and offered to sell him the hot tub and later

- 6
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delivered It to Mr. Davidson's house _

48-53).

Mr. Smith

testified that Mr. Davidson had told Mr. Smith that Mr. Davidson had
purchased the hot tub, and that Mr. Davidson had asked Mr. Smith to
transport the hot tub from Hot Water Products to Mr. Davidson's
house

1 11 11 11 8) .
When defense counsel was examining Scott Montoya, who had

helped Mr. Smith transport the hot tub to Mr. Davidson's house, the
t' r i a I r u i i r t '

m
i in I nil in I

M I II i mi ill* 1 11 MI use cc

f

Mr. Montoya concerning Mr. Davidson's comments when the hot tub was
delivered

«

interes- , ;:
"Credibility

defense counsel argued that Mi

.? impeachment
* exception

Davidson's

.e * :-*. :ur* ruled,
the hearsay rule

JL.

MVJ^J

Appenc . 3.

„. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL RELATING TO
THESE RULINGS.
After the jurors convicted Mr. smith of theft, defense
counsel submitted a moti on for a new trial

alleging,

] , The Court committed reversible error in
the following evidentiary rulings:
a. By denying the defendant's attorney the
right to inquire of the State's principal witness
as to his prior felony convictions for theft and
what role he played in planning the thefts which
resulted in the felony convictions.
b. By denying the defendant an opportunity
to testify regarding his recollection of a
conversation with Scott Davidson when Scott
Davidson was allowed to testify as to his version
of the same conversation for the State.
(R. 64) .

At the first hearing on the motion, after argument, the
trial court denied the portion of the motion relating to
Mr. Davidson's prior convictions (M.H. 7). Defense counsel and the
prosecutor were uncertain about the facts underlying the portion of
the motion relating to the hearsay objection, and the trial court
took that portion of the motion under advisement pending preparation
of a transcript (M.H. 5-7). The trial court allowed defense counsel
to withdraw from the case, and the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association was appointed to represent Mr. Smith (M.H. 8).
At the second hearing on the motion, the trial court
indicated that there was nothing in the court's recollection that
would support the motion for a new trial, and that the most
efficient means of disposing of the case would be to deny the
remainder of the motion for a new trial, which the court did
(M.H.2 2-5).

B. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REFLECT A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE, WHICH RULES MUST BE CONSTRUED TO FACILITATE THE
ACCUSED'S RIGHTS TO DEFEND AGAINST CRIMINAL CHARGES.
Various state and federal constitutional provisions protect
Mr. Smith's right to defend himself.

Article I section 12 of the

Utah Constitution provides,
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
- 8
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committed, and the r ight to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put i n jeopardy for the same offense.
The sixth amendment

che United States Constitution protects the

accused's :i: j gh !:::: b ::: •

"itctt i nn

«i ml i \ i ti i n," 1 fj" I si > ," I m u n

' I t, h e

Utah Constitution and section 1 of I he fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantee the right to due process of
] aw •
These constitutional provisions have been construed *
protecting the accused's right to present a a
cllidcges
U.S.,

284

. * explained

.n Chambers v . M i s s i s s i p p i ,

(1973),

The right of an accused in a criminal trial
to due process is, in essence, the right to a
fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations. The rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in
one's own behalf have long been recognized as
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black,
writing for the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273, 92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948),
identified these rights as among the minimum
essentials of a fair trial.
"A person's right to reasonable
notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense ~ right to his day in court • are basic
in our system of jurisprudence; and
these rights include, at a minimum, a
right to examine the witnesses against
him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel."
Chambers at 2S 4

9

4 10

The accused's constitutional rights to confrontation and to
present a defense have been interpreted as permitting a defendant to
inquire about the criminal history of witnesses testifying against
the defendant.

See Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308 (1974)(discussing

how impeachment of State's witness with witness's criminal history
is key to defendant's constitutional right to confrontation);
State v. Patterson. 656 P.2d 438, 438-439 (Utah 1982)(same);
State v. Conrov, 642 P.2d 873 (Ariz. App. 1982)(same).
In several cases decided under the Utah Rules of Evidence,
rather than under these constitutional provisions, Utah Courts have
recognized the accused's right to defend against criminal charges.
E.g. State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 298 and n.l (Utah Ct. App.
1990)(declining to rule on constitutional grounds and relying on
Utah Rule of Evidence 607, this Court characterized the defendant's
impeachment of the credibility of the state's witness as a right);
State v. Harrison. 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24-25 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)(declining to rule on constitutional grounds and relying on
Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court explained that nevidence tending
to disprove criminal intent should be admitted, even if it is not
particularly strong.").
As is discussed below, in ruling that Utah Rules of
Evidence 609(a) and 404(b) shield the State's witness, the trial
court misinterpreted the rules in a manner violating Mr. Smith's
rights to defend against the criminal charge in this case.

- 10 -

1. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES' CONVICTIONS.
Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) is explicitly designed to

(a) For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant. or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(emphasis added).3
Federal Rule

f

The Utah Ii'ulhp was patterned after the original

Evidence

(which recently : ^ re^r* amended) , and

fedei

in interpreting the Utah Rule.

r

H.

State v. Tucker

e

800 i .-i

,9. 322

3. Other jurisdictions have chosen to omit the language of
the rule explicitly protecting defendants. For example, in Arizona,
Rule 609 reads,
For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that the witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by
public record, if the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect, and if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Volume 17A of Arizona Code, Supplement 1990. As noted previou.
in State v. Conroy, 642 P.2d 873 (Ariz. App. 1982), the court
decided that a criminal defendant's right to confrontation requires
that the defendant be allowed to impeach government witnesses with
prior convictions.

- 11 -

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) .
Several federal courts have recognized that under the
version of Rule 609 reflected in the Utah Rule, government witnesses
are not protected from impeachment.

For example, in United

States v. Nevitt. 563 F.2d 406, (9th Cir. 1977)(per curiam), the
court explained,
The defendant may always use prior felony
convictions of a prosecution witness. "Prejudice
to the witness stemming from revelation of his
past was rejected by Congress as a factor to be
considered by the courts. Confrontation problems
are thus avoided." The district court does not
have discretion to weigh the probative value of a
government witness' prior felony conviction
against its prejudicial effect on the witness or
the Governments case. Rule 609(a) limits the
balancing test to determining prejudicial effect
to the defendant.
Id. at 408-409 (citations omitted).
The legislative history of the federal rule protecting
defendants from impeachment is discussed in United States v. Smith
551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), wherein the court summarized,
The addition of the phrase "to the defendant" at
the end of Rule 609(a)(1) reflects a deliberate
choice to regulate impeachment by prior
conviction only where the defendants interests
might be damaged by admission of evidence of past
crimes, and not where the prosecution might
suffer, or where a non-defendant witness
complains of possible loss of reputation in the
community.
Id. at 359 (emphasis by the court).4

4. The Smith decision was characterized as the "leading
federal case interpreting rule 609(a)" in State v. Bruce, 779 P. 2d
646, 654 (Utah 1989), and has been cited repeatedly by Utah courts.
E.g. State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 1989); State v.
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Banner, 717
P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986).
- 12 -

In Green v, Bock Laundry Machine Co,,

U.S.

104

i nil v i (J! i I m l I llii

of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) after which the Utah Rule w a s
patterned (which federal rule has since been amended)
the legislate ve history ol tlie

"

Ii reviewing

* "" cnujt recognized that

Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)( , is lesigned to encourage a
r

« m i mini I defMMi

•-

*

~esent a d e f e n s e .

riminal defendant's and defense witnesses 7

e admissibility

»Ed.2d at 564 and n,5 - bib,

criminal convictions
iii ^.t:een e x p l i

for the prosecution.

. g

i» i: i ;i ]

I

The Court

ipfill / I

i itnesses

104 l»,Ed,2tJ at 5 6 4 .

The Advisory Committee Note to Utah Rule

* Evidence 609

^ : :)i:i: espoi ids M ii t l l Green

n

recognizing that the rule is designed to protect only criminal
defendants from prior convictions impeachment.
rule

It states, "This

s the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah

.-

aranting

the court discretion in convictions not involving dishonesty
fa] se statement " refuse t ::) admi t: the ev ii ience if It, would be
prejudicial to the defendant.
admission of such evidence."

Current Utah law mandates the
(emphasis added,

Ltations of criminal

r-iser ii iii 11; fed | , See also State v . Patterson,, i

F11 "ml 4\nt

4 in -419

(Utah 1982)(decided under old rules of e v i d e n c e — d e f e n s e counsel
should have been allowed T

inquire concerning the state's witness's

constitutionally protected, because tr i. court made

- 13 -

finding that

interests served by prior rule of evidence 45 (parallel to current
403) called for exclusion of the convictions).
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. section 78-24-9 provides, in
part, "... a witness must answer as to the fact of his previous
conviction of felony."

In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333

(Utah 1986), the Court indicated that Utah Rule of Evidence 609
supersedes section 78-24-9, insofar as the two provisions are
inconsistent.

Id. at 1333.

In the context of impeachment of a

government witness, there is no inconsistency between Rule 609 and
section 78-24-9's requirement for admission of felony convictions.
Even if Rule 609(a) were properly applied to the
impeachment of the government's witness, the balancing test defined
in State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) calls for the
admission of Mr. Smith's felony convictions.

The Banner 609(a)(1)

balancing test requires the consideration of five factors:
[1] The nature of the crime, as bearing on the
character for veracity of the witness.
[2] The recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction . . .
[3] The similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad
person.
[4] The importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tired
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . .
[5] The importance of the accused's testimony, as
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused's character for
veracity. . .
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334 (footnote omitted).
Thefts have been recognized as reflecting poorly on the
veracity of those who commit them.

See e.g. United States v. Smith,
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^51 F.2d 348

-64-365 (D.

*

,

« mi met imc

.-» thefts were committed
;

See Utah

Ldence

609(b)(generally excluding convictions more than ten years o l d ) .
There was no danger that M r . Davidson's crimes were similar to the
• to

charges against
punish M r . Smith.

See Banner factor

Because the case hinged on

the credibility of the two opposing witnesses, M r . Smith and M r .
Davidson

M-T Davidson * s creel i Jb i II 1.1 y w. i ,s i mpi) i i a 111

factor
I hat

Because M r . Davidson was not "the accused,
*

/ to d^

- Banner
appears

uhe fifth Banner factor.

In ruling that the State's witness, M r . Davidson, was
protected by U1 ^. Rule of Evidence 609(a
rioi I si i iterprete .• I
constitutional rights i

*iw

•

trial court
-

Smi thJ"s

present .* defense and confront the

witnesses against him.

2. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b) IS RELAXED WHEN APPLIED TO THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES' CONVICTIONS.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides,
(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
r

-• '

- j

utah Rule of Evidence 404

indicates that the rule follows the federal ru3 e.

Utah Courts have

found federax interpretations of the federal rule persuasive In

- 15 -

interpreting the Utah Rule.

E.g. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,

427 (Utah 1989)(referring to Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence in
interpreting Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)).
Several federal courts interpreting the federal rule have
allowed criminal defendants to present evidence of other witnesses'
other crimes and bad acts.

The court in United States v.

Aboumoussallem, 726 F„2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984), explained the
relaxation of Rule 404(b) when the defense presents the evidence, in
the context of a case like the instant one, where the defendant
wanted to present evidence that he had been duped into committing
criminal acts.

The Court stated:

[W]e believe the standard of admissibility when a
criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence
as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a
prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword. The
prosecution, in the Anglo-American tradition, may
not ordinarily offer evidence of a defendant's
prior wrongdoing for the purpose of persuading
the jury that the defendant has a propensity for
crime and is therefore likely to have committed
the offense for which he stands trial. As Dean
Wigmore points out, the evidence "is
objectionable not because it has no appreciable
probative value but because it has too much."
Presumably, the "too much" argument means that a
guilty person, and, of far more serious concern,
an innocent person, may be convicted primarily
because of the jury's willingness to assume his
present guilt from his prior misdeed. Wigmore
also identifies objections based on the risk that
the jury will convict because the defendant may
not have been punished for his prior offenses and
the injustice of requiring the defendant to
defend against a series of accusations. . . .
However, risks of prejudice are normally absent
when the defendant offers similar acts evidence
of a third party to prove some fact pertinent to
the defense.
Id. at 911 (citations omitted).
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Another case like Aboumoussallem. and the instant case,
I I llh/1 ! I y llllMjl
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government's witness is United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d '
Ci r

1 989)

,n

lth

The court in Cohen recognized that when the defense

seeks l\u presen t: Uie av i deuce 9 Unhi

4IU ("b) is leJdxi^JI,

-

" '""«"..

The Cohen court noted that the United States Supreme Court
Huddleston _v

Q

United States, 4 8 5 u. o. oo

has summarized the legislative history r;

* ' *• . 1 4 * t >

q

8 b; ,

b) as t . ^HWR:

"Congress was not nearly so concerned with the
potential prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b)
evidence as it was with ensuring that
restrictions would not be placed on the admission
of such evidence." 108 S.Ct. at 1501. When the
defendant offers similar acts evidence of a
witness to prove a fact pertinent to the defense,
the normal risk of prejudice is absent.
Id. at 777.
Utah

llliiw i" (j in [ I u i 1 i w i l I ni I I nil " ".'iiiiMW

inState

v

Shickles,

7 60 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), i i i discussing the admission of crimes and
a c t s under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) and ;
implicitly

recognised

I h»i!

I lu< pi e j ud.i i v

I

l>

- e court
*;M,II

in I In i s

context is the possibility that the jurors will ;,e motivated tc
convict the defendant because of the defendant's crimes and bad
acts, rather than because o

* :ie evidence pertinent t, J the charges:

In deciding whether the danger of unfair
prejudice and the like substantially outweighs
the incremental probative value, a variety of
matters must be considered, including the
strength of the evidence as to the commission of
the other crime, the similarities between the
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed
between the crimes, the need for the evidence,
the efficacy of alternative proof and the degree
to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
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Id. at 295-296 (emphasis added).
Even if Rule 404(b) were properly strictly applied to the
acts and crimes of a witness for the prosecution, it would not
exclude Mr. Davidson's crime.

Defense counsel sought to present

evidence of Mr. Davidson's felony theft conviction concerning the
camper shells for the purpose of showing that in following the plans
of others in that criminal enterprise, Mr. Davidson had learned how
to plan a crime to be committed by others.

Defense counsel was

trying to show Mr. Davidson's knowledge and was not merely trying to
show that he was acting in conformity with his past actions.

The

previous convictions were also necessary for impeachment purposes.
See Point B.l of this brief.
barred this evidence.

Hence, Rule 404(b) would not have

See United States v. Cohen, supra (under

Federal Rule 404(b), trial court committed reversible error in
excluding defense evidence concerning the government witness'
criminal know how); State v. Bates. 784 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Utah
1989)("since the evidence of 'prior bad acts' of defendant was not
offered to prove his character or show 'that he acted in conformity
therewith,' the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion for a mistrial.").
In ruling that the State witness' prior conviction was
excluded by Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), the trial court
misinterpreted that rule of evidence, and violated Mr. Smith's
constitutional rights to present a defense and confront the
witnesses against him.
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3. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 802 DOES NOT EXCLUDE EVIDENCE IMPEACHING
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVIDSON.
As noted previously, the trial court excluded Mr. Montoya's
version of Mr. Davidson's comments upon the arrival of the hot tub
at the Davidson residence because "credibility is not an exception
to the hearsay rule." (T. 102).
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 is the general rule excluding
hearsay evidence.

The rule did not bar the presentation of

Mr. Davidson's comments upon the arrival of the hot tub, as
presented through Mr. Montoya, because Mr. Davidson's comments were
presented to impeach Mr. Davidson's testimony, rather than to "prove
the truth of the matter asserted."

Under Utah Rule of Evidence

801(c), just quoted, Mr. Davidson's comments fell outside the
definition of hearsay.

See State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 636

(Utah 1982)(when statement is for impeachment purposes, it falls
outside the definition of hearsay; particularly when person quoting
declarant of impeachment statement is subject to examination, it
should be admitted).
Once again, the trial court's evidentiary error had the
effect of violating Mr. Smith's right to defend against the criminal
charge and to confront the State's witness.

C. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL ERRORS WERE PREJUDICIAL AND REQUIRE A NEW
TRIAL.
Because the trial court's rulings were based on erroneous
views of the law, they constitute abuses of discretion.

Gaw v.

State of Utah, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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Because the trial court's errors violated Mr. Smith's rights to
defend against the criminal charge, they are subject to reversal
unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
P.2d 438, 438-439 (Utah 1982).

State v. Patterson. 656

Particularly when the errors are

viewed cumulatively, see State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah
1989)(recognizing cumulative error), they call for reversal of
Mr. Smith's conviction.
The trial court's rulings shielding Mr. Davidson from
impeachment cannot be considered harmless, much less harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.

This case turns on the conflicting testimony of

two witnesses: Mr. Smith, who testified that he did not know that
the hot tub was stolen, but was transporting the hot tub under Mr.
Davidson's direction; and Mr. Davidson, who testified that the
entire arrangement was initiated by Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith's testimony that he took the hot tub with an
innocent state of mind is supported by the fact that the hot tub was
taken from a lot that is plainly visible from the freeway when it
was light outside (T. 19, 99). When Mr. Smith borrowed the truck
for the hot tub transportation, he told the truck owners he was
going to transport a hot tub that a friend had purchased (T. 85).
Scott Montoya, who helped Mr. Smith retrieve the hot tub, and who
was also charged in this case, indicated that Mr. Smith had asked
him to assist in transporting a friend's hot tub (T. 98). While
Mr. Davidson testified that he paid Mr. Smith $200 upon the arrival
of the hot tub at the Davidson residence (T. 53), Scott Montoya
testified that he did not see any such transaction (T. 102).
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If the jurors had known about Mr. Davidson's criminal
history and had been allowed to hear Mr. Montoya's version of what
Mr. Davidson said when the hot tub arrived, the jurors may have
believed Mr. Smith's defense that Mr. Davidson duped Mr. Smith into
transporting the hot tub.

In these circumstances, the trial court's

erroneous rulings excluding evidence of Mr. Davidson's criminal
history and excluding evidence impeaching his testimony must be
corrected in a new trial.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Smith's conviction and order
the trial court to preside over a new trial in which Mr. Smith is
allowed to defend against the criminal charge to the full extent
permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence and mandated by the Utah and
/U

United States Constitutions.
Respectfully submitted this

n

day of March,

1991.
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APPENDIX 1
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 provides;:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 provides:
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence
of a person 7 s character or a trait of his character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he
acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence
of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of
a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of
a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence
of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607/608, and 609.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah Rule of Evidence 607 provides:
Rule 607.

Who may impeach.

The credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling him.
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 609.
crime•

Impeachment by evidence of conviction of

(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 801.

Definitions.

The following definitions apply this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person
who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving him; or

Utah Rule of Evidence 802 provides:
Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law
or by these rules.

APPENDIX 2
DISCUSSION OF MR. DAVIDSON'S CRIMINAL HISTORY

1

THE COURT:

It does not fit within what you

2

call the classic intent of 803. However, within the

3

literal language, and not meaning to be always a

4

literalist, I think on this particular occasion it will

5

be admitted, if otherwise proper, but it will not be

6

excluded as hearsay,

7
8

MR. VAN SCIVER:

The other issue is who can I

impeach and why?

9

THE COURT:

All right.

I think I can shorten

10

this.

As I understand it, a witness for the prosecution

11

has a prior record concerning two thefts and a false —

12
13

MR. VAN SCIVER:

THE COURT:

15

MR. SKORDAS:

That's right.
Having in his possession a

falsified driver's license.

17

MR. VAN SCIVER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SKORDAS:

20
21

application for a driver's

license.

14

16

—

Whatever.

Right.
And the thefts were both

felonies.
THE COURT:

All right.

The question is whether

22

those are admissible under 609 as reflecting upon

23

credibility.

24

rulings by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

25

prohibiting that type of stuff, except in very limited

Mr. Van Solver's position is that the

circumstances with respect to defendants charged in
criminal cases, does not apply when the person is not a
defendant charged in a criminal case.

And specifically

here we're talking about Mr. Davidson.
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

Correct.
Do you have any cases in support of

the proposition that those rulings are applicable to the
8 I State but not to a defendant?
9

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I think you're splitting the

10

issue by thinking that's the most recent thing that has

11

come down to the court limiting the inquiry regarding the

12

defendant should be applied equally.

13

a concern to some people, but I have always thought if

14

you call somebody as a witness you vouch for their

15

least their credibility.

16

any appropriate fashion consistent with the rules.

17

when you shift to the criminal defendant, probably the

18

most important thing to know is if he's got any priors,

19

then he must have done this.

20

And perhaps that's

—

at

You're entitled to attack it in
But

They are there, the balance, the instruction

21

between prejudice, determining harm, and probative value.

22

And courts are lining up strongly on the proposition that

23

you rule on the case that's before you and not your

24

history.

But that's not true when applied to a witness.

25 J It doesn't mean you have to reject any witness, it's just
64

one of those things to take into account in making a
determination of how much weight to put into his
testimony, and it seems to me that it's appropriate that
he be entitled to that.
We're blaming Davidson for the whole caper and
it's important for this jury to know that he has two
prior felony convictions.
THE COUPT:

All right.

MR. SKORDAS:

Mr. Skordas.

Unfortunately, your Honor, I was

unable to find any case law.

We reviewed the last 10 or

12 cases on this issue and each of those defendants with
a prior conviction of the defendant.

And the only case

that I found that even approached the idea of the
defendant is a witness in an old 1973 case —
it's not that old —

I guess

but, basically, it indicates that a

witness must answer to the fact of his prior convictions
of felonies, and that a criminal in a criminal case may
be cross-examined by counsel for the State the same as
any other witness, which is actually the sort of a flip
side of what we're arguing here.

And that is they are

saying that the defendant is on the same scale as any
other witness.
And what I'm arguing is that the witness is on
the same standard as the defendant with respect to his
prior convictions.

I think the Court also needs to make
65

a finding that probative value of these prior convictions
outweighs their prejudicial content, not that it's just
on the prior convictions but that they are probative and
the purpose of these convictions is to show that he — I
assume it is —

that he committed this theft on this

occasion.
The best way to prove that a most probative
issue of that is his plea of guilty to this very issue.
The only thing that is added by the prior felony
convictions is prejudice, the jury against Mr. Davidson.
THE COURT:

You don't have any problem with Mr.

Van Sciver making inquiry into the guilty plea in Mr.
Davidson's

—

MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

On this matter?

—

MR. SKORDAS:

case involving this hot tub?
No, I don't have any problem with

that.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

Let me —

The rules are not premised on

anyone vouching for the credibility of witnesses they
call.

In fact, the rules, in Section 600 specifically

indicate that one can challenge the credibility of a
witness that even that party calls.
I think that differs a little bit by the
66

1

criminal context when you're talking about prosecution,

2

because I think the prosecution must vouch for the

3

credibility of the witnesses it calls on the respective

4

matter they intend to call them, and that is, in this

5

case Mr. Davidson's testimony as to the involvement of

6

Mr. Smith.

7

have to vouch for their credibility.

8
9

As to all other matters, I don't think they

In reading this Supreme Court case, the most
recent one, and the previous cases of the Court of

10

Appeals that limited the inquiry into the prior record of

11

a defendant.

12

that the type of thing that can be brought out must

13

relate to one's propensity for telling the truth rather

14

than one's propensity for committing crime, even if they

15

may be crimes of stealth.

16

They focused on the credibility issue, and

For that reason, I believe that they would

17

treat all witnesses the same under Rule 609, and in

18

determining their probative versus their inflammatory

19

nature under 402.

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

21

prior to '83 would be inappropriate.

22

his cases that happen, which permits me to cite anything

23

before '83, certainly everything since then, and we're

24

supposed to be starting anew.

25

Let me say this: Anything
I'll take half of

And the rules encourage a fresh interpretation.
67

I mean, they say so.

And when he's arguing that I can't

attack his witness unless you reason that I can put on
some evidence of the propensity to commit the crime,
well, that's like the dichotomy between impeachment and
reasonable doubt.

And it seems to me that I'm entitled

to attack the credibility of this witness, as he would
be, consistent with the rules.

And I think the only

possible interpretation is I'm entitled, because it
relates to the probability that he masterminded this
operation, which is our belief, and also that the fact
that he has been convicted of two prior felonies of theft
lead to the probability that he in fact masterminded it.
I think all of that is subject to relevant
inquiry.

And I think I'm entitled to ask those

questions.
THE COURT:

You believe you're entitled to have

the full extent of cross-examination of Mr. Davidson to
show generally that he's not a credible witness, and in
doing so, you would be limited in terms of prior bad acts
to those that reflect upon his honesty and integrity in
testimonial context, so you'll be limited in that way by
the recent rulings of the Utah Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals.

But as to examining him concerning his

propensity for masterminding something like that, I
believe you're entitled to further examine him if you can
68

show in those prior circumstances that he was in fact the
mastermind, limited to that issue.

I think you are

entitled to make that inquiry.
Now, with that ruling in mind, I think we need
to have Mr. Davidson here so that you can make your
inquiry of him under oath outside the hearing of the jury
to determine whether or not those three prior convictions
might have involved false statement, and we know one did.
And I'll allow that.

But inquiry as to the two thefts,

whether they involved something more than your run-ofthe-mill theft, so you'll determine whether or not
there's evidence you can present by him through the jury
that he was the mastermind of either one of those thefts,
and/or whether either of those thefts involved such
conduct that it would relate to his ability to testify
truthfully.
So somehow it's theft by deception, things like
that, then it would be allowed in.
Davidson available?

Do we have Mr.

And only, Mr. Van Sciver, if you

have evidence independent of Mr. Davidson on those
matters, you will be allowed to present that too.
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

Do what?

If you had evidence independent of

Mr. Davidson's own testimony on those matters, you can
put that in too.
69

1
2

Mr. Davidson, would you step forward and be
sworn?

3
4

SCOTT T. DAVIDSON.

5

called as a witness by the defendant, having been duly

6

sworn, was examined and testified upon his oath as

7

follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

8
9
10

BY MR. VAN SCIVER:

11

Q.

You are Scott T. Davidson; is that correct?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And you're the defendant in Criminal No. 89-

14

1228; is that correct?

15

A.

Yes, I think so.

16

Q.

In that matter, you pled guilty to what?
MR. SKORDAS:

17
18

It would have been receiving

stolen property, a Class A misdemeanor.

19

THE COURT:

Receiving stolen property?

20

THE WITNESS: Yes.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Van Sciver, you may

22

inquire of Mr. Davidson concerning the two thefts. The

23

other matter, if you want to, too, the driver's license

24

matter.

25

Q.

(By Mr. Van Sciver)

About the driver's
70

1

license, as I recall, you told us that you had filled out

2

an application for a driver's license.

3

A.

No, I hadn't filled out an application for one.

4

Q.

How is it that this driver's license charge

5
6

came against you?
A.

Person I knew was making driver's licenses with

7

altered birth dates on them.

8

from him •

9
10

Q.

And I just acquired one
1

So you possessed a card wherein you

intentionally told something that was not true?

11

A.

Yes, basically.

12

Q.

How long ago was that?

13

A.

About eight years ago.

14

Q.

How old are you?

15

A.

26.

\6

Q.

It occurred when you were 18?

17

A.

Right around there.

18

Q.

Then you have been convicted of two felonies

19

since then?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

They're both theft crimes?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And they are what years?

24

A.

'86, '85, '84, somewhere around in there.

25

Q.

Are the facts reasonably fresh in your mind?
71

1

A.

Pretty much.

2

Q.

You pled to a felony three years ago, and the

3

facts of each —

4

A.

Well, the facts really aren't, but, yes.

5

Q.

The facts really aren't?

6

know about those cases.

7

those?

The judge wants to

Are you able to tell us about

8

A.

Yes, to the best of my knowledge, sure.

9

Q.

Take the oldest one, '85.

10

A.

Okay.

11

Q.

Tell us what happened.

12

A.

I think it was a burglary and it involved drugs

13

and I had to repay some money, and —
THE COURT:

14
15

You need to keep your voice up, Mr.

Davidson.»

1

THE WITNESS:

16

Oh.

And I was put in a position

17

where I needed to come up with a few things for some

18

people, and I committed a burglary.

19
20

Q.

(By Mr. Van Sciver)

Okay.

So you owed

somebody some money?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Did you tell them you would pay them back?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Basically, I didn't have a choice.
And did you make at least —

how is it

that you came to owe the money?
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1

A,

It was over drugs.

Q.

All right.

Did you give them a deadline?

I

mean, was there some false things you said to this
person?
A.

No.

Q.

Well, then, why did you have to go commit a

burglary?
A.

Well, it's a complicated story, really.

I got

ripped off on some things that weren't mine, and I was
held responsible for them.
Q.

They wanted what?

A.

A computer.

So they wanted a computer.

And they gave me a list of things

they wanted, to compensate for that.
Q.

Okay.

So you went out and filled the list for

them?
A.

Basically, yes.

Q.

Okay.

And the next one —

so it's out and out

burglary theft?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And there's no false statements that you're

aware of other than, perhaps, your participation was
wrong?
A.

Yes, but no false statement, no.

Q.

You were apparently placed on probation.

A.

Yes, I was.
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Q.

And was that ever revoked?

A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

Because of a theft*

Q.

Another theft?

A.

Yes.

Q.

¥ou made a bunch of implicit promises in the

Over a carpenter shop.

probation agreement which you signed in writing.
A.

Yes.

Yes, basically, probation agreement.

Q.

And I suppose, by your actions, you lied?

A.

No, I just didn't live up to the agreement that

I had.
Q.

When you signed it, you committed the next

felony in that you promised not to violate the law?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Technically, I guess.

So by your actions, you lied.

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, your Honor, I don't see

where a violation of probation is a crime involving
dishonesty.

I don't know that in either case it's going

to get any better than that sort of fabrication.
Q.

Run us quickly through the facts in number

A.

I got involved with some people that were

two.

taking camper shells, and I got involved with them and I
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1

took one myself with them.

2 J
3

Q.

Were there some parallels in that one and in

this one?

4

A.

I don't understand what you mean.

5

Q.

Who planned the taking of those?

6 I

A.

Another guy did.

7

Q.

What role did you play?

8

A.

Mainly labor.

9

Q.

What?

10

A.

Just labor.

11

Q*

You got caught with the camper shell?

12

A.

Yes.

13
14

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:
the

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

Then they gave you a grocery list

and you were to go there and get it?

23
24

This place would have what they

wanted.

21
22

They gave you the information as to

—

19
20

Well, the other guys gave me the

information on it, and the rest of it was up to me.

17
18

Who

planned the burglary?

15
16

What about the burglary?

THE WITNESS:
Q.

Yes.

(By Mr. Van Sciver)

In terms of setting the

25 J time, determining when you were going to do it, who
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planned that out?
A.

I guess I did.
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

I think I got that one.

Do you have any other testimony you

want to get from this gentleman?
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

No.

Mr. Skordas, do you have some

8 I cross?
9

MR. SKORDAS: No.

10
11

THE COURT:

You may step down, Mr. Davidson.

We'll be recalling you, so stick around.

12

It seems to me the most that's been established

13

through the testimony is that Mr. Skordas should feel

14

free to address thisf that as to the burglary may be a

15

question of fact for the jury as to who planned it, and

16

whether or not that reflects upon who did what in this

17

case, or as to Mr. Davidson's credibility, if there is

18

any evidence from him that Mr. Smith planned this.

19
20

So with that in mind, do you want to react to
that, Mr. Skordas?

21

MR. SKORDAS:

22

THE COURT:

I'm not sure where we are.

Right now, unless you persuade me

23

otherwise, I'll allow Mr. Van Sciver to inquire only as

24

follows:

25

Concerning the criminal record of Mr. Davidson.
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He can search on inquiry in front of the jury about the
driver's license matter, and he can inquire about the
burglary, for the purpose of probing whether or not Mr.
Davidson was a planner and a leader on that.
MR. SKORDAS:

So essentially 404(b) evidence,

and we have drifted from 609, character evidence, to
proof of conduct.

And, of course, once he asks him about

the other burglary, that's it.

If Davidson alleged he

wasn't the head person in that, then the damage is done.
THE COURT:

Do you folks expect Mr. Davidson to

say —
MR. VAN SCIVER:
expressed concern.11

It's structured as "you have

He says it's Smith's deal.

Smith

says, "No, I was following Davidson's orders."
MR. SKORDAS:

Exactly right.

Davidson is going

to testify that Smith sold him a hot tub for $500, which
proved to be hot.
THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Skordas does raise

another interesting limitation, and that is character
reference.
MR. VAN SCIVER:

That's why you're entitled to

impeachment, because it's character reference as to
truthfulness.

I mean, I would be much more inclined to

put my belief in the word of someone who had not been
convicted of a felony.

That's exactly why you get to do
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1

that, for impeachment.

2

you have.

3

Truth is the character trait that

THE COURT:

I think my ruling will remain the

4

same, that he can inquire into the burglary.

5

609 —

6 1
7
8
9

MR. SKORDAS:

Under both

He wasn't even convicted of a

burglary.
THE COURT:

But we're talking about a 404, with

other crimes, wrongs, or acts, to show such things as

10

motive, opportunity, and intent, preparation, plan,

H

knowledge, identity, or maybe most important in this

12

case, absence of mistake or accident.

13

All right.

14

MR. VAN SCIVER:

15
16
17

Do we know where we're going?
I think.

I'm sure you can

remind us if we stray.
THE COURT:

All right.

Is the ruling clear

enough for you, Mr. Skordas?

18

MR. SKORDAS:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

Are we ready to bring the jury in?

20

Let's do so.

I have gone through the jury instructions

21

proposed by Mr. Skordas, have taken out 12-A, suggesting

22

the defendant will not testify, and substituting my

23

reasonable doubt instruction for that of Mr. Skordas'. I

24

have otherwise left them the same.

25

problems with the jury instructions, of that format?

Do you have any
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1

your testimony.

You may be excused, if you would like.

2

Who is your next witness?

3

MR. SKORDAS: We'll call Scott Davidson.

4

THE COURT: All right.

The court reporter has

5

been at it for an hour and a half.

I realize the jury has

6

only been at it for an hour.

7

on the record about something also.

8

if we can take a ten-minute break right now.

9

admonition of the Court, do not discuss this matter with

I need to talk to counsel
So why don't we see
Remember the

10

anyone, including among yourselves, do not form or express

11

any opinions and conclusions. We'll see you in about ten

12 minutes.
13

[Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.]

14

THE COURT:

The record should indicate that

15

the jury is now departed.

16

are still present, along with the State.

17

The defendant and his counsel

I have been thinking about this ruling, and

18

the more I think about it, the more it appears to me that

19

you're talking about character evidence of Mr. Davidson.

20

The character evidence is admissible only in certain ways,

21

and specific instances of character should be shown that

22

on

23

the time, and the question is generally not admissible.

24

So I'm thinking about changing my ruling on that.

25

character was in conformity with the actions at

MR. VAN SCIVER:

You don't want to ever do that,
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1

THE COURT:

I looked over the rules, and it

2

appears to me if you want character evidence, we're talking

3

about the character of Mr, Davidson.

4

in certain ways.

5

of his character with a particular incident on the date

6

in question.

^

It's got to come in

And the disclaimed way is proving conformitjy

I don't think you can do it.

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, all I can do is say that -j

8

and I believe this to be a sound statement of the law —

9

if you call somebody as a witness, you vouch for their

10

credibility, that it follows that someone who is a convicted

11

felon or at least assignment of responsibility is his, that

12

someone who has been convicted of a felony is less credible.

13

And I think that is the rule, and that is you're entitled

14

to inquire of someone who is a witness offered by the

15

government.

16

THE COURT:

But when the government and the

17

Supreme Court have ruled on these cases, they have ruled

18

under Rule 609. They have not ruled under Rule 404, and

19

they have addressed that very thing on credibility with

20

respect to a defendant, and have addressed it only in context]

21

of credibility and not in the context of Rule 404, prejudice.

22

if they had addressed it in the context of

23

Rule 404, then I would say that there may be a different

24

standard applicable to known defendant witnesses, because

25

thev have said the conviction of a crime does not reflect
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1

generally upon credibility.

2

MR. VAN SCIVER:

If what I have interpreted,

3

and I thought this was your ruling, Crime No. 1 in '85 is

4

out, you couldn't inquire because it wasn't anything the

5

finder of fact could determine from that and it would address!

6

itself to just trying to discredit him.

7

one, particularly if he contends that it's Smith's idea,

8

can be inquired into.

9

THE COURT:

But that the other

That was my original ruling. What

10

I'm saying now, and that ruling was independent of credibility,

11

it was really directed to character.

12
13

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I think not.

The latter, you

almost have to wait and see what his answers are.

14

THE COURT:

Well, if his answers are sufficient

15

that you can challenge his credibility because he testified

16

falsely on credibility, absolutely you can go after him on

17

credibility.

18

propensity to be a leader in ill-gotten goods, because that

19

was character evidence.

But I don't think you can inquire about his

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

21

THE COURT:

All right,

My ruling is changed in that you

22

cannot inquire concerning the burglary incident for the

23

purpose of showing that he's a leader.

24
25

MR. VAN SCIVER:
fine.

Well, I just, you know, that's

If we leave out the word leader,. I donft know where
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1

we'll go, and all I'm saying to you, thanks for the direction),

2

but I think maybe it's a little premature to decide where

3

I need to stop,

4

THE COURT: Well --•

5

MR. VAN SCIVER:

6

I'm not going to go over the

line.

7

THE COURT:

I'm saying you're not going to be

8

able to get into the proposition on the burglary that he's

9

a leader, that leaves only the possibility of credibility.

10

And I heard nothing from his testimony that would indicate

11

that that burglary was of such a nature that it involved

12

false statements indicating that his testimonial character

13

is subject to challenge. And, therefore, I have nothing

14

in front of me right now to indicate that it would be appropriate

15

for you to bring out his conviction on the burglary on the

16

theft.

17

MR. VAN SCIVER:

18

THE COURT: All right.

19

Okay.
So we're left only with

the —

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

21

THE COURT:

22

Okay.

False driver's license.

Right. And whether or not — how

his deal in this case reflects upon his credibility.

23

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Right. All right.

24

THE COURT: We'll take a short recess.

25

[Whereupon, court was in recess at 2:50 p.m.]
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APPENDIX 3
TRIAL COURT'S HEARSAY RULING CONCERNING MR. MONTOYA'S
QUOTATION OF MR. DAVIDSON

1

Q.

2

And were there any markings on that tub that

you can recall?
k

3
4

all.

There was a tag on it, a sold tag.

That was

Other than just the hot tub itself.

5

Q.

Did you see any signs of any kind on the fence?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

There wasn't anything on the fence?

8

All right.

Where did you go from there?

9 I

A.

We drove out to the street which was —

the

10

south I'm not sure, then headed east toward State Street

11

and got to State Street and headed north towards Murray

12

High School.

13

Q.

All right.

What was to be your destination?

14

k

We had to stop and make a phone call because

15

Rodney didn't have the address to Scott's house.

16

met us behind Murray High School and we followed him to

17

his house from there.

18
19
20

Q.

What occurred when you got to Mr. Davidson's

k

I backed the truck to the side of his house

house?

21

and we unloaded it, and that was it.

22

of his house, you know, behind the house.

23
24
25

So he

Q.

Put it in the back

Were you present during any conversations between

Mr. Smith and Mr. Davidson?
A.

I was there the whole time, yes.
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1

ft

What was discussed between you?

2

k

The only conversation —

3

MR. SKORDAS:

4

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I object.

That was hearsay.

Well, I suppose it could be

5

an exception to hearsay, at least as to credibility, because

6

it would be offered,

7

both declarants.

arguably, against the interest of

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. VAN SCIVER: Yes.

10
11

MR. SKORDAS:

Well, it's not going to come out

that way.

12
13

Going on what was said?

THE COURT: All right. Credibility is not an
exception to the hearsay rule.

14

MR. VAN SCIVER:

No, but being offered against —

15

ft

Was there a conversation that you overheard?

16

A.

Yes.

17

ft

All right.

18

Did you see anything exchange hands

between the two gentlemen?

19

k

No.

20

ft

When did you leave Mr. Davidson's premises?

21

k

I don't know the exact time. We were probably

22
23
24
25

there maybe 15 minutes.

ft

And, again, the time that you arrived at the

yard where the tub was was when?
k

I would say about quarter to 6:00.

In that
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